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	<title>Comments for The Philosophy 2008 Blog</title>
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		<title>Comment on 4. A Response to a Non-Philosophical Stimulus by hurburghwhite</title>
		<link>http://uwcseaphilosophy2008.wordpress.com/2008/04/17/4-a-response-to-a-non-philosophical-stimulus/#comment-49</link>
		<dc:creator>hurburghwhite</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 17 Apr 2008 14:44:52 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://uwcseaphilosophy2008.wordpress.com/?p=15#comment-49</guid>
		<description>A good, indepth response to this stimulus, Zuriel. Remember Kant&#039;s response of the &#039;transcendental ego&#039; as he suggests - in this stimulus - colour and depth must be perceived by something. THis provides a good contrast to Hume&#039;s Bundle Theory. You allude to the thing-in-itself and the assumptions built into our perceptions - does Locke&#039;s Tabula Rasa fail because of this, or does he also refer to the unknowable in our existence?</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>A good, indepth response to this stimulus, Zuriel. Remember Kant&#8217;s response of the &#8216;transcendental ego&#8217; as he suggests &#8211; in this stimulus &#8211; colour and depth must be perceived by something. THis provides a good contrast to Hume&#8217;s Bundle Theory. You allude to the thing-in-itself and the assumptions built into our perceptions &#8211; does Locke&#8217;s Tabula Rasa fail because of this, or does he also refer to the unknowable in our existence?</p>
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		<title>Comment on 4. A Response to a Non-Philosophical Stimulus by Z..</title>
		<link>http://uwcseaphilosophy2008.wordpress.com/2008/04/17/4-a-response-to-a-non-philosophical-stimulus/#comment-48</link>
		<dc:creator>Z..</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 17 Apr 2008 14:35:50 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://uwcseaphilosophy2008.wordpress.com/?p=15#comment-48</guid>
		<description>Continued....

The fact that we cannot, through introspection find a &#039;self&#039; in within ourselves, hardly proves anything. Because if the only means of experiencing the world, including ourselves, is through our perceptions, neither then should we expect to understand or find a world or a &quot;self&quot; outside of perception. It is no wonder then, that we should not catch &#039;ourself&#039; without a perception, for we are always perceiving, and it would be impossible to perceive the self outside of our perception of ourselves.

Humes theory does seem to present quite a few problems...</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Continued&#8230;.</p>
<p>The fact that we cannot, through introspection find a &#8217;self&#8217; in within ourselves, hardly proves anything. Because if the only means of experiencing the world, including ourselves, is through our perceptions, neither then should we expect to understand or find a world or a &#8220;self&#8221; outside of perception. It is no wonder then, that we should not catch &#8216;ourself&#8217; without a perception, for we are always perceiving, and it would be impossible to perceive the self outside of our perception of ourselves.</p>
<p>Humes theory does seem to present quite a few problems&#8230;</p>
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		<title>Comment on 4. A Response to a Non-Philosophical Stimulus by Zuriel</title>
		<link>http://uwcseaphilosophy2008.wordpress.com/2008/04/17/4-a-response-to-a-non-philosophical-stimulus/#comment-47</link>
		<dc:creator>Zuriel</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 17 Apr 2008 14:34:24 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://uwcseaphilosophy2008.wordpress.com/?p=15#comment-47</guid>
		<description>Hume&#039;s Theory of the &#039;self&#039; as non-existent, being nothng more than a bundle of perceptions is represented by the above stimulus in the way the man&#039;s &quot;self&quot; or identity is obscured. That which we call the &#039;self&#039; when unperceived, is non-existent. An object is no more than a collection of its properties - there is no substance. In the same way, the hand can be identified as a &#039;hand&#039; only because we can clearly perceive it - its shape, proportion, etc. through seeing it. However, it the rest of the person cannot be perceived - then there is essentially no person. The gradual loss of the man&#039;s &quot;properties&quot; behind the screen as his outline blurs, suggests the graudal loss of perceptions. Not perceiving anything, the person would cease to exist. Thus the loss of experience means complete annihilation. 

But Hume never explains what constitues as a &quot;bundle&quot; - how much &quot;perception&quot; we must experience to make us human. Neither does he account for who bound up these perceptions into bundles to make individuals, creatures and objects. In other words, the properties&#039; compresence - the relationship between these properties that brings them together into the same bundle.

The language-reality objection also questions the legitimacy of an object&#039;s supposed &quot;properties&quot;. For how are we to know when we perceive, that the cause of these percetions are the objects themselves, i.e. the properties of the objects? It may well be that our &#039;perceptions&#039; are just abstractions of previous experiences, and that we attribute or project these abstractions onto a thing - that thing itself being a substance bare of all properties (a bare particular). Which by this arguement, the concept of a &#039;self&#039; is re-introduced. An essence of a &#039;self&#039; that can exist independent of our perceptions - our perceptions of the world being affixed to this &#039;bare particular&#039; that is the self.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Hume&#8217;s Theory of the &#8217;self&#8217; as non-existent, being nothng more than a bundle of perceptions is represented by the above stimulus in the way the man&#8217;s &#8220;self&#8221; or identity is obscured. That which we call the &#8217;self&#8217; when unperceived, is non-existent. An object is no more than a collection of its properties &#8211; there is no substance. In the same way, the hand can be identified as a &#8216;hand&#8217; only because we can clearly perceive it &#8211; its shape, proportion, etc. through seeing it. However, it the rest of the person cannot be perceived &#8211; then there is essentially no person. The gradual loss of the man&#8217;s &#8220;properties&#8221; behind the screen as his outline blurs, suggests the graudal loss of perceptions. Not perceiving anything, the person would cease to exist. Thus the loss of experience means complete annihilation. </p>
<p>But Hume never explains what constitues as a &#8220;bundle&#8221; &#8211; how much &#8220;perception&#8221; we must experience to make us human. Neither does he account for who bound up these perceptions into bundles to make individuals, creatures and objects. In other words, the properties&#8217; compresence &#8211; the relationship between these properties that brings them together into the same bundle.</p>
<p>The language-reality objection also questions the legitimacy of an object&#8217;s supposed &#8220;properties&#8221;. For how are we to know when we perceive, that the cause of these percetions are the objects themselves, i.e. the properties of the objects? It may well be that our &#8216;perceptions&#8217; are just abstractions of previous experiences, and that we attribute or project these abstractions onto a thing &#8211; that thing itself being a substance bare of all properties (a bare particular). Which by this arguement, the concept of a &#8217;self&#8217; is re-introduced. An essence of a &#8217;self&#8217; that can exist independent of our perceptions &#8211; our perceptions of the world being affixed to this &#8216;bare particular&#8217; that is the self.</p>
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		<title>Comment on 2. A Response to a Non-Philosophical Stimulus by hurburghwhite</title>
		<link>http://uwcseaphilosophy2008.wordpress.com/2008/04/12/2-a-response-to-a-non-philosophical-stimulus/#comment-46</link>
		<dc:creator>hurburghwhite</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Sun, 13 Apr 2008 10:47:20 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://uwcseaphilosophy2008.wordpress.com/?p=11#comment-46</guid>
		<description>I also see Camus&#039; Myth an option here - the starkness of his existence - up/down or black/white, equating meaning with colour.

A question that comes to mind is Are we free to create our own meaning (colour our own lives?)</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>I also see Camus&#8217; Myth an option here &#8211; the starkness of his existence &#8211; up/down or black/white, equating meaning with colour.</p>
<p>A question that comes to mind is Are we free to create our own meaning (colour our own lives?)</p>
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		<title>Comment on 2. A Response to a Non-Philosophical Stimulus by meian</title>
		<link>http://uwcseaphilosophy2008.wordpress.com/2008/04/12/2-a-response-to-a-non-philosophical-stimulus/#comment-45</link>
		<dc:creator>meian</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Sun, 13 Apr 2008 10:38:02 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://uwcseaphilosophy2008.wordpress.com/?p=11#comment-45</guid>
		<description>the harsh black and white lines on the being seem to represent a sort of mental or even physical straightjacket to his freedom. i would focus on Sartres concept of radical and metaphysical freedom, particularly his story of the prisoner in chains, who while had lost his phsycial freedom, still retained his mental freedom, leaving him free to think and make cognitive decisions. in contrast, a darwinistic, biolgical appraoch could be used to argue for determinsm in individuals. that we are all puppets, controlled by our genetic makeup and chemical impulses.
though i thought gillians interpretation was really unique and interesting to take</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>the harsh black and white lines on the being seem to represent a sort of mental or even physical straightjacket to his freedom. i would focus on Sartres concept of radical and metaphysical freedom, particularly his story of the prisoner in chains, who while had lost his phsycial freedom, still retained his mental freedom, leaving him free to think and make cognitive decisions. in contrast, a darwinistic, biolgical appraoch could be used to argue for determinsm in individuals. that we are all puppets, controlled by our genetic makeup and chemical impulses.<br />
though i thought gillians interpretation was really unique and interesting to take</p>
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		<title>Comment on 2. A Response to a Non-Philosophical Stimulus by hurburghwhite</title>
		<link>http://uwcseaphilosophy2008.wordpress.com/2008/04/12/2-a-response-to-a-non-philosophical-stimulus/#comment-44</link>
		<dc:creator>hurburghwhite</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Sun, 13 Apr 2008 06:52:23 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://uwcseaphilosophy2008.wordpress.com/?p=11#comment-44</guid>
		<description>This is a good approach - I hadn&#039;t thought of this dimension and it is a valid one. A good use of your understanding from the optional themes in the Core Theme. Very legitimate.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>This is a good approach &#8211; I hadn&#8217;t thought of this dimension and it is a valid one. A good use of your understanding from the optional themes in the Core Theme. Very legitimate.</p>
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		<title>Comment on 1. Response to a Non-Philosophical Stimulus by gilliandb</title>
		<link>http://uwcseaphilosophy2008.wordpress.com/2008/04/07/1-response-to-a-non-philosophical-stimulus/#comment-43</link>
		<dc:creator>gilliandb</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Sun, 13 Apr 2008 06:48:55 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://uwcseaphilosophy2008.wordpress.com/?p=8#comment-43</guid>
		<description>I agree with Anna in that the Other is imporatant in defining identity. That&#039;s the flaw with the Mind-Body discussion in order to define a human being, because it is very self-engrossed and doesn&#039;t take into account the role of obligation, family and society. As seen in Locke&#039;s Price and the Cobbler example: if the Prince&#039;s consciousness was transferred into the Cobbler&#039;s body, it is argued that he is now the Prince due to the memories that have been transferred. However Locke does idenfity but doesn&#039;t solve the issue of how the Cobbler is percieved. I would never be able to confirm that the Prince&#039;s consciousness is inhabiting the Cobbler&#039;s body, so i would continue approaching him as the Cobbler i previously knew him to be. In a modern day society of skeptics, everyone would continue treating him as the Cobbler too, which leads me to believe that the Prince within him would adapt to his new role in society because it is impossible to be sure of other minds. 

Therefore, within this stimulus you could also discuss other minds this impossibility.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>I agree with Anna in that the Other is imporatant in defining identity. That&#8217;s the flaw with the Mind-Body discussion in order to define a human being, because it is very self-engrossed and doesn&#8217;t take into account the role of obligation, family and society. As seen in Locke&#8217;s Price and the Cobbler example: if the Prince&#8217;s consciousness was transferred into the Cobbler&#8217;s body, it is argued that he is now the Prince due to the memories that have been transferred. However Locke does idenfity but doesn&#8217;t solve the issue of how the Cobbler is percieved. I would never be able to confirm that the Prince&#8217;s consciousness is inhabiting the Cobbler&#8217;s body, so i would continue approaching him as the Cobbler i previously knew him to be. In a modern day society of skeptics, everyone would continue treating him as the Cobbler too, which leads me to believe that the Prince within him would adapt to his new role in society because it is impossible to be sure of other minds. </p>
<p>Therefore, within this stimulus you could also discuss other minds this impossibility.</p>
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		<title>Comment on 2. A Response to a Non-Philosophical Stimulus by gilliandb</title>
		<link>http://uwcseaphilosophy2008.wordpress.com/2008/04/12/2-a-response-to-a-non-philosophical-stimulus/#comment-42</link>
		<dc:creator>gilliandb</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Sun, 13 Apr 2008 06:33:49 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://uwcseaphilosophy2008.wordpress.com/?p=11#comment-42</guid>
		<description>In terms of political philosophy, I see this as the individual&#039;s lack of influence onto society&#039;s political framework. Therefore i&#039;d use Hobbes&#039; Leviathan figure against Rousseau and evaluate the extent of our control over society. 

Or, i would consider the state of nature identified by these political philosophers. I&#039;d contrast the altruistic nature of man as seen by Rousseau against Hobbes&#039; war-like savage beast. Then, i&#039;d argue that this image portrays the fact that man is not wholly in control of his being and that forces such as a basic state of nature influences who he is (therefore he is in an inferior, cowering position).</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>In terms of political philosophy, I see this as the individual&#8217;s lack of influence onto society&#8217;s political framework. Therefore i&#8217;d use Hobbes&#8217; Leviathan figure against Rousseau and evaluate the extent of our control over society. </p>
<p>Or, i would consider the state of nature identified by these political philosophers. I&#8217;d contrast the altruistic nature of man as seen by Rousseau against Hobbes&#8217; war-like savage beast. Then, i&#8217;d argue that this image portrays the fact that man is not wholly in control of his being and that forces such as a basic state of nature influences who he is (therefore he is in an inferior, cowering position).</p>
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		<title>Comment on 1. Response to a Non-Philosophical Stimulus by hurburghwhite</title>
		<link>http://uwcseaphilosophy2008.wordpress.com/2008/04/07/1-response-to-a-non-philosophical-stimulus/#comment-41</link>
		<dc:creator>hurburghwhite</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Sun, 13 Apr 2008 05:47:07 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://uwcseaphilosophy2008.wordpress.com/?p=8#comment-41</guid>
		<description>An excellent summary of the positions Anna, using the NPS well in your responses. Your example of Bankers is an interesting one. Certainly not one that would come to mind but it does work. I like the idea of identity being formed by others - something we haven&#039;t yet done in Gr11. 

Anyone else reading this, think other examples that you could use that would assist in highlighting the philosophical issues that emerge out of this stimulus.

One your final point, &quot;put together in order to define who we are over a period of time as all of these will vary through time&quot;, do you think there is any formula that could describe our composite (and fluid) identity?</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>An excellent summary of the positions Anna, using the NPS well in your responses. Your example of Bankers is an interesting one. Certainly not one that would come to mind but it does work. I like the idea of identity being formed by others &#8211; something we haven&#8217;t yet done in Gr11. </p>
<p>Anyone else reading this, think other examples that you could use that would assist in highlighting the philosophical issues that emerge out of this stimulus.</p>
<p>One your final point, &#8220;put together in order to define who we are over a period of time as all of these will vary through time&#8221;, do you think there is any formula that could describe our composite (and fluid) identity?</p>
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		<title>Comment on 1. Response to a Non-Philosophical Stimulus by chitmananna</title>
		<link>http://uwcseaphilosophy2008.wordpress.com/2008/04/07/1-response-to-a-non-philosophical-stimulus/#comment-40</link>
		<dc:creator>chitmananna</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Sun, 13 Apr 2008 05:39:46 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://uwcseaphilosophy2008.wordpress.com/?p=8#comment-40</guid>
		<description>1.Hume’s bundle of perceptions 

The self is only a bundle of perceptions. We can only see ourselves through our own perception. For example, the robot can only see itself by looking at its mask. It will think it is a human. This will lead us to Locke and Descartes the self as our consciousness. However, we do not know whether it is aware itself is a robot. As long as it sees itself as a human, it will remain a human in its own thinking. Another example is in Blade Runner, Rachel sees herself as a human-being, yet she is actually a robot. The self that is seen by others and by ourselves are different from each other since we all have various ways of seeing things. Thus, there is no self but only a bundle of perceptions which also varies with time.

2.Locke’s consciousness

If the same consciousness is being preserved, no matter what has changed physically, the same identity is also being preserved. Nevertheless, if this robot has the same consciousness as a certain human-being, then it must have the same identity as that person. And since identity is something which is there to define why we are different from each other, then what is the difference between the human and a robot that possess the same consciousness? Therefore, consciousness is valid enough to define our identity. 

3.Michaels’s body theory

Michaels reminds us that physical is also important to your identity as it is the only thing we can perceive. Without our physical self, there cannot be an identity. Our appearance and how we present ourselves should be considered as our identity as well. For example, bankers will choose to present themselves in a certain way, that is to make others trust them and believe in them. And that’s their identity as bankers. Yet, our identity will varies with time for our perceptions, our thoughts and our physical self cannot remain the same over a long period of time. A banker in a bank, working, and a banker who is on holiday will have different appearance. That will destroy the sameness, or identity, of that banker. 

Thus, it is a combination of many factors, such as appearance, perceptions, thoughts, consciousness, put together in order to define who we are over a period of time as all of these will varies through time.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>1.Hume’s bundle of perceptions </p>
<p>The self is only a bundle of perceptions. We can only see ourselves through our own perception. For example, the robot can only see itself by looking at its mask. It will think it is a human. This will lead us to Locke and Descartes the self as our consciousness. However, we do not know whether it is aware itself is a robot. As long as it sees itself as a human, it will remain a human in its own thinking. Another example is in Blade Runner, Rachel sees herself as a human-being, yet she is actually a robot. The self that is seen by others and by ourselves are different from each other since we all have various ways of seeing things. Thus, there is no self but only a bundle of perceptions which also varies with time.</p>
<p>2.Locke’s consciousness</p>
<p>If the same consciousness is being preserved, no matter what has changed physically, the same identity is also being preserved. Nevertheless, if this robot has the same consciousness as a certain human-being, then it must have the same identity as that person. And since identity is something which is there to define why we are different from each other, then what is the difference between the human and a robot that possess the same consciousness? Therefore, consciousness is valid enough to define our identity. </p>
<p>3.Michaels’s body theory</p>
<p>Michaels reminds us that physical is also important to your identity as it is the only thing we can perceive. Without our physical self, there cannot be an identity. Our appearance and how we present ourselves should be considered as our identity as well. For example, bankers will choose to present themselves in a certain way, that is to make others trust them and believe in them. And that’s their identity as bankers. Yet, our identity will varies with time for our perceptions, our thoughts and our physical self cannot remain the same over a long period of time. A banker in a bank, working, and a banker who is on holiday will have different appearance. That will destroy the sameness, or identity, of that banker. </p>
<p>Thus, it is a combination of many factors, such as appearance, perceptions, thoughts, consciousness, put together in order to define who we are over a period of time as all of these will varies through time.</p>
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