<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><rss version="2.0"
	xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/"
	xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/"
	xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom"
	xmlns:sy="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/syndication/"
	xmlns:georss="http://www.georss.org/georss" xmlns:geo="http://www.w3.org/2003/01/geo/wgs84_pos#" xmlns:media="http://search.yahoo.com/mrss/"
		>
<channel>
	<title>Comments on: 1. Response to a Non-Philosophical Stimulus</title>
	<atom:link href="http://uwcseaphilosophy2008.wordpress.com/2008/04/07/1-response-to-a-non-philosophical-stimulus/feed/" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml" />
	<link>http://uwcseaphilosophy2008.wordpress.com/2008/04/07/1-response-to-a-non-philosophical-stimulus/</link>
	<description>Welcome to your Philosophy Blog</description>
	<lastBuildDate>Thu, 17 Apr 2008 14:44:52 +0000</lastBuildDate>
	<generator>http://wordpress.com/</generator>
	<sy:updatePeriod>hourly</sy:updatePeriod>
	<sy:updateFrequency>1</sy:updateFrequency>
		<item>
		<title>By: gilliandb</title>
		<link>http://uwcseaphilosophy2008.wordpress.com/2008/04/07/1-response-to-a-non-philosophical-stimulus/#comment-43</link>
		<dc:creator>gilliandb</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Sun, 13 Apr 2008 06:48:55 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://uwcseaphilosophy2008.wordpress.com/?p=8#comment-43</guid>
		<description>I agree with Anna in that the Other is imporatant in defining identity. That&#039;s the flaw with the Mind-Body discussion in order to define a human being, because it is very self-engrossed and doesn&#039;t take into account the role of obligation, family and society. As seen in Locke&#039;s Price and the Cobbler example: if the Prince&#039;s consciousness was transferred into the Cobbler&#039;s body, it is argued that he is now the Prince due to the memories that have been transferred. However Locke does idenfity but doesn&#039;t solve the issue of how the Cobbler is percieved. I would never be able to confirm that the Prince&#039;s consciousness is inhabiting the Cobbler&#039;s body, so i would continue approaching him as the Cobbler i previously knew him to be. In a modern day society of skeptics, everyone would continue treating him as the Cobbler too, which leads me to believe that the Prince within him would adapt to his new role in society because it is impossible to be sure of other minds. 

Therefore, within this stimulus you could also discuss other minds this impossibility.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>I agree with Anna in that the Other is imporatant in defining identity. That&#8217;s the flaw with the Mind-Body discussion in order to define a human being, because it is very self-engrossed and doesn&#8217;t take into account the role of obligation, family and society. As seen in Locke&#8217;s Price and the Cobbler example: if the Prince&#8217;s consciousness was transferred into the Cobbler&#8217;s body, it is argued that he is now the Prince due to the memories that have been transferred. However Locke does idenfity but doesn&#8217;t solve the issue of how the Cobbler is percieved. I would never be able to confirm that the Prince&#8217;s consciousness is inhabiting the Cobbler&#8217;s body, so i would continue approaching him as the Cobbler i previously knew him to be. In a modern day society of skeptics, everyone would continue treating him as the Cobbler too, which leads me to believe that the Prince within him would adapt to his new role in society because it is impossible to be sure of other minds. </p>
<p>Therefore, within this stimulus you could also discuss other minds this impossibility.</p>
]]></content:encoded>
	</item>
	<item>
		<title>By: hurburghwhite</title>
		<link>http://uwcseaphilosophy2008.wordpress.com/2008/04/07/1-response-to-a-non-philosophical-stimulus/#comment-41</link>
		<dc:creator>hurburghwhite</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Sun, 13 Apr 2008 05:47:07 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://uwcseaphilosophy2008.wordpress.com/?p=8#comment-41</guid>
		<description>An excellent summary of the positions Anna, using the NPS well in your responses. Your example of Bankers is an interesting one. Certainly not one that would come to mind but it does work. I like the idea of identity being formed by others - something we haven&#039;t yet done in Gr11. 

Anyone else reading this, think other examples that you could use that would assist in highlighting the philosophical issues that emerge out of this stimulus.

One your final point, &quot;put together in order to define who we are over a period of time as all of these will vary through time&quot;, do you think there is any formula that could describe our composite (and fluid) identity?</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>An excellent summary of the positions Anna, using the NPS well in your responses. Your example of Bankers is an interesting one. Certainly not one that would come to mind but it does work. I like the idea of identity being formed by others &#8211; something we haven&#8217;t yet done in Gr11. </p>
<p>Anyone else reading this, think other examples that you could use that would assist in highlighting the philosophical issues that emerge out of this stimulus.</p>
<p>One your final point, &#8220;put together in order to define who we are over a period of time as all of these will vary through time&#8221;, do you think there is any formula that could describe our composite (and fluid) identity?</p>
]]></content:encoded>
	</item>
	<item>
		<title>By: chitmananna</title>
		<link>http://uwcseaphilosophy2008.wordpress.com/2008/04/07/1-response-to-a-non-philosophical-stimulus/#comment-40</link>
		<dc:creator>chitmananna</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Sun, 13 Apr 2008 05:39:46 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://uwcseaphilosophy2008.wordpress.com/?p=8#comment-40</guid>
		<description>1.Hume’s bundle of perceptions 

The self is only a bundle of perceptions. We can only see ourselves through our own perception. For example, the robot can only see itself by looking at its mask. It will think it is a human. This will lead us to Locke and Descartes the self as our consciousness. However, we do not know whether it is aware itself is a robot. As long as it sees itself as a human, it will remain a human in its own thinking. Another example is in Blade Runner, Rachel sees herself as a human-being, yet she is actually a robot. The self that is seen by others and by ourselves are different from each other since we all have various ways of seeing things. Thus, there is no self but only a bundle of perceptions which also varies with time.

2.Locke’s consciousness

If the same consciousness is being preserved, no matter what has changed physically, the same identity is also being preserved. Nevertheless, if this robot has the same consciousness as a certain human-being, then it must have the same identity as that person. And since identity is something which is there to define why we are different from each other, then what is the difference between the human and a robot that possess the same consciousness? Therefore, consciousness is valid enough to define our identity. 

3.Michaels’s body theory

Michaels reminds us that physical is also important to your identity as it is the only thing we can perceive. Without our physical self, there cannot be an identity. Our appearance and how we present ourselves should be considered as our identity as well. For example, bankers will choose to present themselves in a certain way, that is to make others trust them and believe in them. And that’s their identity as bankers. Yet, our identity will varies with time for our perceptions, our thoughts and our physical self cannot remain the same over a long period of time. A banker in a bank, working, and a banker who is on holiday will have different appearance. That will destroy the sameness, or identity, of that banker. 

Thus, it is a combination of many factors, such as appearance, perceptions, thoughts, consciousness, put together in order to define who we are over a period of time as all of these will varies through time.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>1.Hume’s bundle of perceptions </p>
<p>The self is only a bundle of perceptions. We can only see ourselves through our own perception. For example, the robot can only see itself by looking at its mask. It will think it is a human. This will lead us to Locke and Descartes the self as our consciousness. However, we do not know whether it is aware itself is a robot. As long as it sees itself as a human, it will remain a human in its own thinking. Another example is in Blade Runner, Rachel sees herself as a human-being, yet she is actually a robot. The self that is seen by others and by ourselves are different from each other since we all have various ways of seeing things. Thus, there is no self but only a bundle of perceptions which also varies with time.</p>
<p>2.Locke’s consciousness</p>
<p>If the same consciousness is being preserved, no matter what has changed physically, the same identity is also being preserved. Nevertheless, if this robot has the same consciousness as a certain human-being, then it must have the same identity as that person. And since identity is something which is there to define why we are different from each other, then what is the difference between the human and a robot that possess the same consciousness? Therefore, consciousness is valid enough to define our identity. </p>
<p>3.Michaels’s body theory</p>
<p>Michaels reminds us that physical is also important to your identity as it is the only thing we can perceive. Without our physical self, there cannot be an identity. Our appearance and how we present ourselves should be considered as our identity as well. For example, bankers will choose to present themselves in a certain way, that is to make others trust them and believe in them. And that’s their identity as bankers. Yet, our identity will varies with time for our perceptions, our thoughts and our physical self cannot remain the same over a long period of time. A banker in a bank, working, and a banker who is on holiday will have different appearance. That will destroy the sameness, or identity, of that banker. </p>
<p>Thus, it is a combination of many factors, such as appearance, perceptions, thoughts, consciousness, put together in order to define who we are over a period of time as all of these will varies through time.</p>
]]></content:encoded>
	</item>
	<item>
		<title>By: hurburghwhite</title>
		<link>http://uwcseaphilosophy2008.wordpress.com/2008/04/07/1-response-to-a-non-philosophical-stimulus/#comment-36</link>
		<dc:creator>hurburghwhite</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 11 Apr 2008 15:00:29 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://uwcseaphilosophy2008.wordpress.com/?p=8#comment-36</guid>
		<description>Thank you for this Gillian - very articulate and concise. From a broader perspective, remember that language is a legitimate topic in the Core Theme. Does thought equal language and can you have a private language? Consequently, is thought the differentiator we believe it can be? The role of reason in our evaluation of thinking is due to Plato. Nietzsche, the great &#039;irrationalist&#039;, was mistakenly labelled it was assumed that he rejected the validity of reason in critique when in actual fact he was merely rejecting the Platonic foundation of our thinking. Heidegger, drawing inspiration from Nietzsche, established a critique of technical reason - a one-dimensional reason that denied the richness of human thought.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Thank you for this Gillian &#8211; very articulate and concise. From a broader perspective, remember that language is a legitimate topic in the Core Theme. Does thought equal language and can you have a private language? Consequently, is thought the differentiator we believe it can be? The role of reason in our evaluation of thinking is due to Plato. Nietzsche, the great &#8216;irrationalist&#8217;, was mistakenly labelled it was assumed that he rejected the validity of reason in critique when in actual fact he was merely rejecting the Platonic foundation of our thinking. Heidegger, drawing inspiration from Nietzsche, established a critique of technical reason &#8211; a one-dimensional reason that denied the richness of human thought.</p>
]]></content:encoded>
	</item>
	<item>
		<title>By: gilliandb</title>
		<link>http://uwcseaphilosophy2008.wordpress.com/2008/04/07/1-response-to-a-non-philosophical-stimulus/#comment-35</link>
		<dc:creator>gilliandb</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 11 Apr 2008 12:12:21 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://uwcseaphilosophy2008.wordpress.com/?p=8#comment-35</guid>
		<description>The image implies that the inner make-up of a human is void of an &quot;immaterial spirit&quot; (identified by Locke), but i beg to differ. As Mei-An says, you have to take into account the Searle&#039;s chinese room thought experiment to understand that a human is not a biological machine, but there is semantic value and an intangible facet to our being. The mechanic nature of the image&#039;s inner bits does not show this. For example, if I decide to peel the skin off of every human being, we would all look identical: organs, tissues, bones etc. (unless things have been removed). It must be so that there is another element to our being that differentiates us from eachother. Drawing in the Cartesian understanding to our being, you can not be certain of anything other than your own individual thought and it is this individual thought that makes you different from eachother.

It can be argued, however, that thought is a product of mechanical processes in the body. This can be refuted by questioning WHY it is that we equate technical processes with thought. Doesn&#039;t the brain work in order to allow the body to move and have reflexes? This chemical brain process can be traced scientifically, but how can we prove that this chemical process was what created the sentiments of annoyance, happiness or sadness in us? 

All in all,the human contains a more profound and immaterial aspect to it as noted by Locke, and i find that a criticism of the body theory can be drawn from this stimulus</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>The image implies that the inner make-up of a human is void of an &#8220;immaterial spirit&#8221; (identified by Locke), but i beg to differ. As Mei-An says, you have to take into account the Searle&#8217;s chinese room thought experiment to understand that a human is not a biological machine, but there is semantic value and an intangible facet to our being. The mechanic nature of the image&#8217;s inner bits does not show this. For example, if I decide to peel the skin off of every human being, we would all look identical: organs, tissues, bones etc. (unless things have been removed). It must be so that there is another element to our being that differentiates us from eachother. Drawing in the Cartesian understanding to our being, you can not be certain of anything other than your own individual thought and it is this individual thought that makes you different from eachother.</p>
<p>It can be argued, however, that thought is a product of mechanical processes in the body. This can be refuted by questioning WHY it is that we equate technical processes with thought. Doesn&#8217;t the brain work in order to allow the body to move and have reflexes? This chemical brain process can be traced scientifically, but how can we prove that this chemical process was what created the sentiments of annoyance, happiness or sadness in us? </p>
<p>All in all,the human contains a more profound and immaterial aspect to it as noted by Locke, and i find that a criticism of the body theory can be drawn from this stimulus</p>
]]></content:encoded>
	</item>
	<item>
		<title>By: hurburghwhite</title>
		<link>http://uwcseaphilosophy2008.wordpress.com/2008/04/07/1-response-to-a-non-philosophical-stimulus/#comment-34</link>
		<dc:creator>hurburghwhite</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 11 Apr 2008 10:32:19 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://uwcseaphilosophy2008.wordpress.com/?p=8#comment-34</guid>
		<description>I agree Mei An - this stimulus presents itself fairly clearly. I like the idea evident in this stimulus of the superficiality of identity. The identity of &#039;being human&#039; is replicated, but what about the meaning? Self-reflection or self-awareness is suggested here and twisted to suggest a decision of whether being human is the ultimate goal - a very anthropocentric view of things.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>I agree Mei An &#8211; this stimulus presents itself fairly clearly. I like the idea evident in this stimulus of the superficiality of identity. The identity of &#8216;being human&#8217; is replicated, but what about the meaning? Self-reflection or self-awareness is suggested here and twisted to suggest a decision of whether being human is the ultimate goal &#8211; a very anthropocentric view of things.</p>
]]></content:encoded>
	</item>
	<item>
		<title>By: Meian</title>
		<link>http://uwcseaphilosophy2008.wordpress.com/2008/04/07/1-response-to-a-non-philosophical-stimulus/#comment-33</link>
		<dc:creator>Meian</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 11 Apr 2008 10:18:24 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://uwcseaphilosophy2008.wordpress.com/?p=8#comment-33</guid>
		<description>well if we&#039;re going to do a little but of brainstorming this seems like a pretty straight forward stimulus.
The whole concept of the self is the first thing that comes to mind. a Locke vs Michaels, or even Dennett argument. But i think it would be more interesting to look at the AI aspect of the stimulus. Blade runner, and A.I., esp the characters Rachel and David. I guess its interesting how the robot seems to be looking into his face, whcih could be seen as his identity. he almost seems to be self ascribing which could be said to challenge Searles no understanding chinese room experiment. the arguement here would be, does this robot, or being, have a consciousness, as it looks into its own eyes? and from there an identity. Searle vs Turing it seems. i think you could even look at the problem of other minds, esp the philosophers zombie, consciousness inessentialism and all. the robot seems to put a hole in mills arguement from analogy for evidence of other minds.
hmmm</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>well if we&#8217;re going to do a little but of brainstorming this seems like a pretty straight forward stimulus.<br />
The whole concept of the self is the first thing that comes to mind. a Locke vs Michaels, or even Dennett argument. But i think it would be more interesting to look at the AI aspect of the stimulus. Blade runner, and A.I., esp the characters Rachel and David. I guess its interesting how the robot seems to be looking into his face, whcih could be seen as his identity. he almost seems to be self ascribing which could be said to challenge Searles no understanding chinese room experiment. the arguement here would be, does this robot, or being, have a consciousness, as it looks into its own eyes? and from there an identity. Searle vs Turing it seems. i think you could even look at the problem of other minds, esp the philosophers zombie, consciousness inessentialism and all. the robot seems to put a hole in mills arguement from analogy for evidence of other minds.<br />
hmmm</p>
]]></content:encoded>
	</item>
</channel>
</rss>
